This paper studies the effectiveness of taxes, subsidies and cash incentives in reducing unhealthy food consumption. Using an inter-temporal rational choice model with habit, we calibrate and simulate the effect of those policies to US and UK data. Our findings suggest that cash incentives may be the most effective policy in reducing unhealthy food consumption. However, when comparing the reduction in costs for the social security system with the implementation costs, cash incentives can lead to significant monetary losses. Taxes are relatively ineffective in reducing unhealthy food consumption. Finally, subsidies have the best balance between effectiveness and monetary benefits to society.
Introduction
Worldwide obesity has more than doubled since 1980 due to the increased intake of energydense foods with high levels of fat, salt and sugars with low fibre and vitamins, and a decrease in physical activity (World Health Organization (WHO)). In the US, 68% of the population over twenty years old was overweight or obese during [2007] [2008] . 1 In the UK, 57% of the population over sixteen years old was overweight or obese in 2008.
Overweight and obesity represent an economic problem for governments because they can cause negative externalities in terms of higher cost for the social security system. In the US, the obesity-attributable medical expenditures were 9.1% of total annual medical expenditures in 1998, and approximately one-half of these expenditures were financed by Medicare and Medicaid (Finkelstein et al. (2003) ). 2 Most recently, Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012) estimate that 20.6% of US national health expenditures are spent treating obesity-related illness. In the UK, the overweight and obesity attributable medical expenditures were 16.2% of the total costs for the National Health Service (NHS) in 2006-07 (Scarborough et al. (2011) ).
In order to reduce overweight and obesity, governments have responded with a variety of interventions, including traditional public policies like product taxes (e.g. tax on sugary beverages), and educational and informational programmes (e.g. promoting the advertisement of the health consequences associated with unhealthy food consumption and adding nutritional intake information to food packages). The US has announced new rules for school meals in order to reduce childhood obesity; subsiding healthy meals (e.g. fruits and vegetables). 3 Some European countries, like Romania, Hungary and France, are promoting taxes on unhealthy foods. 4 Currently in the UK there is a discussion concerning the use of incentives to promote healthy behaviour. 5 This discussion has been motivated by some examples where local incentive schemes had been piloted, including people receiving cash for losing agreed amounts of weight, and children being rewarded with toys in exchange for eating more fruits and vegetables. This paper addresses the following questions: are taxes, subsidies and cash incentives effective in reducing unhealthy food consumption? If so, which one is the most appropriate policy to tackle the obesity problem?
In order to answer these questions, we use a model where consumers face an inter-temporal decision problem on the healthiness of the diet to follow. In this decision problem, consumers have a trade-off between present and future utility. Choosing an unhealthy diet has the advantage that it is less expensive and more convenient than the healthy alternative. However, whilst the healthy diet has no long term consequences in future utility, the unhealthy diet decreases future utility as it causes the agent to be less healthy. We also consider the existence of habit: the marginal utility from eating either healthy or unhealthy food at any point in time depends on the consumer's past diet. This means that, for instance, a consumer who is used to following a healthy diet derives more utility from eating healthy food than a consumer who is used to eating unhealthy. Within the setting just described, we consider the effects of three different policies on the level of unhealthy food consumption within the population: a tax on unhealthy food, a subsidy to healthy food and cash incentives in the form of a monetary reward to those consumers who decrease their unhealthy food intake. We use a calibration approach to simulate the effect of these three policies in two countries, the US and UK.
Our results suggest that cash incentives may be the most effective policy to tackle the obesity problem as it ensures a greater reduction in the number of people with unhealthy diets.
Given the discount factor and the presence of habit, most consumers' behaviour depends on their initial diets. Hence, since most consumers initially choose unhealthy diets (probably because of a failure to anticipate the long term negative effects on utility), motivating healthy food consumption via cash incentives has a significant positive effect on the aggregate level of unhealthy food consumption. Taxes are the least effective policy in reducing unhealthy food consumption. Subsidies, on the other hand, are relatively effective in reducing unhealthy food consumption. This is because of the differences in prices between healthy and unhealthy food; given the low cost of unhealthy food, a percentage tax on unhealthy food has only a small effect on the relative price difference between the two types of food whilst the same percentage applied as a subsidy to healthy food has a much greater effect.
The comparison of the monetary benefits due to the reduction in costs for the social security system and the implementation costs of each policy suggest that cash incentives have very low net benefits. In fact, cash incentives may have negative long term benefits in the US and the UK. Thus, cash incentives as a desirable policy depends partly on the social, non-monetary, benefits of having a healthier population. Subsidies, on the other hand, can lead to a significant surplus considering the savings they cause in the long term to the social security system. Our calibration shows that with a 10% subsidy to healthy food the government can save in the long term up to $874 billion in the US and £56 billion in the UK.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Next we present a discussion on the relevant literature. In Section 2 we describe the model. A particular case of the model is presented in Section 3 whilst Section 4 provides the general case. In Section 5 we calibrate the model and simulate the effect of the different policies on the level of unhealthy food consumption in a population. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
A large debate surrounds the eating habits and its health and economic consequences, yet not much work has been devoted to the issue of unhealthy food consumption. As Goel (2006) points out, the economics literature on obesity is still in its infancy. Only few papers have studied the agent's decision to consume unhealthy food while rationally considering the adverse effects on health. Levy (2002) considers a dynamic model of non-addictive eating to explain overweight, underweight and cyclical food consumption. He finds that when certain physiological, psychological, environmental and socio-cultural conditions are present an expected lifetime-utility maximiser chooses to be overweight. Yaniv (2002) uses a rational decision model to explain individual's deviation from a prescribed low-fat diet when there is the possibility that the consumer suffers a heart attack in the future. Yaniv finds that excess high-fat consumption may be due to the fact that the risk of a heart attack drives the individual to behave more oblivious of the future. Dragone and Savorelli (2012) study how social conformism can affect individual eating behaviour within a framework where individuals are aware of how food consumption affects body weight. They show that it can be optimal to be on a diet despite being underweight, or binge despite being overweight. The rest of the existing literature on this topic is empirical, and focuses mainly in the causes of the observed rise in overweight and obesity (see, for example, Cutler et al. (2003) , Gruber and Frakes (2006) , and Rashad et al. (2006) ).
To our knowledge, only few papers analyse economic implications of different government policies targeting consumers' diets. Some papers focus on the effect of educational information on food choices and body weight. Variyam and Cawley (2006) show that the Nutrition Labeling and the Education Act caused a decrease in body weight and the probability of begin obese among non-Hispanic white women in US. Acs and Lyles (2007) suggest that providing calorie information to individuals may only have small effects on food choices. Other papers focus on taxes and subsidies: Cash et al. (2004) argue that subsidies to fruits and vegetables (thin subsidies) encourages the consumption of healthier foods. Richards et al. (2007) suggest that price-based policies, sin taxes, or produce subsidies that change the expected future costs and benefits of consuming carbohydrate-intensive food can be effective in controlling excessive nutrient intake. Schroeter et al. (2008) argue that a small subsidy on diet soft drinks would be less weight-decreasing than a tax on caloric soft drinks. Yaniv et al.
(2009) use a food-intake rational choice model to address the effect of a tax on junk food and a subsidy on healthy meals and show that a fat tax will reduce (increase) obesity for a nonweight-conscious (weight-conscious) individual, while a thin subsidy may increase obesity for a non-weight-conscious individual. Fletcher et al. (2010) show that soft drink taxation, as currently practised in the US, leads moderate reduction in soft drink consumption by children and adolescents. However, according to their study the reduction in soda consumption is completely offset by increases in consumption of other high-calorie drinks. Finally, Volpp et al. (2008) argue that financial incentives can be effective in inducing initial weight loss. The authors show in an experiment that a group of obese people lost weight after 16 weeks when given financial incentives. Nevertheless, substantial amounts of weight were gained between the end of the weight loss phase and the follow-up three months later.
Our theoretical model builds on Becker and Murphy (1988) , henceforth BM, but focuses on the unhealthy food consumption problem instead of any general addictive behaviour. Our model is a simplification of BM's model where the main difference is that in our model time is discrete which allows us to obtain a more realistic calibration and interpretation of the model.
The Model
Before dealing with a population of agents, we first deal with individual behaviour by considering the inter-temporal decision problem of a single consumer.
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . Food can be of two types: healthy and unhealthy. We consider that unhealthy food is any food that would cause the consumer to become overweight given her life-style. Unhealthy food includes food that is high in fat, salt and sugar, and low in fibre and vitamins. Healthy food, on the other hand, includes food that is low in fat, salt and sugar, and high in fibre and vitamins. We assume that the total amount of food the consumer purchases at any given period is normalised to one. The decision of the consumer at any given point in time is how much of unhealthy food x ∈ [0, 1] to purchase.
Denote by x t the value of x at time t. Thus, 1 − x t is the intake of healthy food in period t.
We refer to a diet as the value of x. When comparing two diets, we say that a certain diet is healthier than another one if its amount of the unhealthy food x is lower. Note that instead of explicitly modeling the amount of food consumed and the life-style of the individual we summarise these two elements in the single variable x.
To model the long term effects of the different diets, we assume that although both unhealthy and healthy food are equally useful in feeding the consumer, they differ in that the unhealthy food has a negative health effect in the future. The healthy food, on the other hand, has no long term consequences. Even though unhealthy food has a negative effect in the future, it may be attractive because it is more convenient than the alternative, healthy food: unhealthy food is cheaper in monetary terms (see, for instance, Monsivais (2010)), takes less time to cook (pre-cooked meals instead of meals cooked at home), is easier to find (fast food restaurant versus buying raw ingredients at the supermarket) and easier to dispose of (disposable packaging as opposed to doing the dishes). All these effects are summarised by assuming that healthy food is more expensive than unhealthy food.
Notice that whether a consumer gains (or loss) weight is determined by what is known as the Energy Balance Equation: weight gain is equal to the difference between energy intake and energy expenditure. Empirical evidence for the US suggests that caloric expenditure has not changed significantly since 1980, while calories consumed have risen markedly (Cutler et al. (2003) ). In line with this, we suppose that the caloric expenditure is constant and, thus, in our model weight gain is associated with an increase in the consumption of unhealthy food.
Each time period the consumer faces a trade-off: consuming unhealthy food is cheaper than healthy food but it decreases future utility. We recreate this trade-off by following the standard economic modeling approach of endowing the consumer with an utility function. In particular, we assume that the utility function of the consumer at period t is given by
where {x k } t 0 is the sequence of present and past consumption of unhealthy food. The function D is an aggregation of present and past consumption of unhealthy food. We assume D is given recursively by
Denote by D(x 0 , 1 − x 0 ) the consumers' initial diet and it is set to a value in [0, 1] . The function D is convenient for two reasons. First, it captures the effect of past consumption of unhealthy food and the current consumption of unhealthy food on current utility: at time t, past consumption of unhealthy food negatively affects current utility through the term
. Second, D is analytically tractable and easy to interpret: if the consumption of unhealthy food has always been x, i.e. Each period t the consumer maximises the discounted sum of future utility by choosing
If we disregard the constant terms the consumer's problem at time t is
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor. The trade-off in the consumer's maximisation problem is clear: unhealthy food negatively affects consumer's future utility through the function v, however, it is cheaper than healthy food.
Notice that the consumer faces exactly the same problem at every t, hence it suffices to solve it for any arbitrary period t. For notational convenience define
A Simple Case
As an initial step to understand individual behaviour, we study a particular case of our model
where v is the identity function (v(D) = D). If v is the identity function then utility is linear
in the consumption of unhealthy food, hence there is no habit formation. In other words, the consumption of unhealthy food in the present period does not affect the marginal utility of consuming unhealthy food in future periods.
If we compute the partial derivative with respect to any x k at a given t, we obtain
) .
Proposition 1. Assume that v is the identity function. The diet that maximises the discounted sum of utility is given by {x
According to Proposition 1, the agent's optimal long run diet is to consume only unhealthy (healthy) food when the price difference between healthy and unhealthy food (p 1−x − p x ) is greater (smaller) than the discounted effect of unhealthy food consumption on future utilities γ 1+γ(1−δ) .
Habit Formation
In this section and henceforth we assume v ′′ > 0. This means that increasing the consumption of unhealthy food in the current period increases the future return of consuming unhealthy food. Similarly, increasing the consumption of healthy food in the current period increases the future return of consuming healthy food. Therefore, if a consumer increases her current consumption of unhealthy food then she is more likely to increase it even more in the future.
The effect of a higher consumption of healthy food in the current period on the future consumption of healthy food is analogous.
Notice that the strength of habits is implicit in the functional form of v. In this section we keep a general functional form for v whilst in the next section we parametrise and calibrate the model.
Take any arbitrary period t. Since for all {x
Hence, we can interpretx t−1 as the weighted average diet the consumer has followed in the past up to t − 1.
Using the previous definition and disregarding the constant terms, we can rewrite the maximisation problem at time t as Proof. If we take the partial derivatives at time t with respect to x k with k ≥ t in equation
(1) we obtain
where v ′ is the derivative of v with respect to D at time i. If we now compute the second partial derivatives we have
As v ′′ > 0 implies
Moreover, if at the optimum x t = 1 then it must be that
Thus, since v ′′ > 0 and x t = 1 impliesx t >x t−1 , we must have that
Hence, if at the optimum x t = 1 then at the optimum x t+1 = 1. Iterating on this reasoning we can conclude that if at the optimum x t = 1 then it must be that at the optimum x k = 1 for all k = t, . . . , ∞. Using similar steps, it can be shown that if at the optimum x t = 0 then the optimum has x k = 0 for all k = t, . . . , ∞. Therefore, the optimal sequence of unhealthy food consumption is such that {x k } ∞ k=t = {x} ∞ k=t with x ∈ {0, 1}.
This implies that the consumer derives maximum one period utility if she consumes x = 0 at time t. Furthermore, for all two sequences {x k } T 0 and {x k ′ } T 0 with T > t that are different only in that x t = 0 and
. Thus, ifx t−1 <x then the optimum has x k = 0 for all k ≥ t.
Ifx t−1 >x then by similar arguments as those used above, the consumer derives maximum one period utility if she consumes x = 1 at time t. However, it is still true that for all two sequences {x k } T 0 and {x k ′ } T 0 with T > t that are different only in that x t = 0 and
. Hence, although the consumer derives more one period utility at time t if she consumes x t = 1, if δ is high enough the gain in utility from consuming x t = 1 instead of x t = 0 does not offset the long term loss in utility.
In this case we have that there exists a threshold valueδ such that if δ <δ then the optimal diet is x k = 0 for all k ≥ t whilst if δ >δ then the optimal diet is x k = 1 for all k ≥ t. food. This is a direct consequence of assuming that only one unit of food is consumed per period and that v ′′ > 0. This dichotomous result poses no problem for interpreting the model, rather the opposite, it makes interpretation easier. The link between the healthiness of the diet chosen by the consumer and her weight in this framework is as follows. When the consumer chooses to eat unhealthy (x = 1) we consider she is overweight. On the other hand, when the consumer chooses to eat healthy (x = 0) she is not overweight. This simplifies the interpretation in our model when we introduce a population of consumers (next section), so different agents will choose different diets with x ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, on aggregate a certain percentage of the population will eat unhealthy and be overweight, and the rest of the population will eat healthy and not be overweight.
Policy Discussion
In order to study the effect of different policies on the unhealthy food consumption in a population, we assume that consumers differ in their parameter γ. As already mentioned, the parameter γ captures characteristics such as lifestyle, genetics, peer effect, etc. Hence, a population with a higher average γ can be interpreted as a society that is more concerned towards its well being and how it looks, exercise regularly, their bodies deal better with the consumption of unhealthy food, has been historically more inclined towards healthier foods, etc. In order to simplify the calculations we keep constant across agents the discount factor δ and the functional form of v.
The three policies we consider in this paper are a tax, a subsidy and cash incentives. A tax is represented in the model by an increase in the price of unhealthy food from p x to p x (1 + t), where t is the size of the tax. Similarly, a subsidy is represented by a decrease in the price of healthy food from p 1−x to p 1−x (1 − s), where s is the size of the subsidy.
Finally, cash incentives consists of a monetary reward of I whenever the individual consumes healthy food. That is, with cash incentives we add to the utility of the consumer, U t , the term ∑ ∞ i=t δ i−t 1 x t I where 1 x t equals 1 if x t = 0 and 0 otherwise.
All three policies can reduce the population's consumption of unhealthy food and, therefore, they may have a permanent effect even if the policy is applied only temporarily. This can happen because by changing the optimal decision of a consumer at a certain point in time her habits changed, hence it is possible to also affect her future decisions. More specifically, consider a consumer who finds it is optimal to choose the unhealthy diet. Therefore, by proposition 2 we must have thatx t−1 >x. When policy P ∈ {t, s, I} is implemented, if we letx(P ) be the value ofx in proposition 2 when such policy is introduced, then given that v ′ , v ′′ > 0 we havex(t),x(s),x(I) <x. Therefore, we could have thatx t−1 <x(P ) with P ∈ {t, s, I} and the consumer chooses the healthy diet when a policy is introduced. If this happens, then it is possible that a consumer moves from a situation wherex t−1 >x to a situation wherex T +t−1 <x after the policy P has been in place for T periods. From time T + t on, the consumer follows the healthy diet even if the policy is removed.
In this respect, it is worth noticing the difference between our setting and that of BM in terms of policy implications. In BM temporary changes on the prices of the addictive good have smaller effect on current consumption than permanent changes. In this paper, on the contrary, a temporary policy that is able to change the consumer's habits can be as effective as a permanent one.
Calibration
In this subsection we calibrate the model and simulate the effects of the three different policies for the US and the UK.
We assume that the population is such that γ, the parameter that represents individual characteristics, follows a normal distribution truncated between 0 and 1. We write this as
, where µ is the mean and σ 2 is the variance. We set σ 2 = 0.1 and consider three different possible values for the mean, µ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}.
The initial consumption of unhealthy food, x 0 , is random and equal to either 0 or 1. We use a Bernoulli distribution and set at random x 0 = 1 for 68% of the population and x 0 = 0 for 32% of the population in the case of the US, and x 0 = 1 for 57% of the population and x 0 = 0 for 43% of the population in the case of the UK. These values correspond to the WHO estimates whereby 68% of the US population and 57% of the UK population is overweight. Each time period is set equal to a quarter and the discount factor is assumed to take the value δ = 0.987. Given that each time period represents a quarter, we have that 0.987 4 = 0.949, which is in line with current studies where the annual discount rate is found to be around 0.95 (see for instance Laibson et al. (2008) ).
Since each time period is a quarter, the prices p x and p 1−x represent the quarterly spending on unhealthy and healthy food respectively. If a proportion y of the population is overweight and e is the quarterly expenditure on food of an average consumer we have that
Monsivais et al. (2010) estimate that the ratio between the price of healthy food and unhealthy food is between 1 and 8.3, depending on the nutrient density of the food under consideration. Using the fact that in our model all consumers purchase the same amount of food per period we focus on an intermediate value for this ratio and set 4.5p x = p 1−x . Thus,
For the US, using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 7 we obtain that e = $1, 610.75. We assume the function v to be such that
where the exponent n > 1 and the scaling factor N > 0 are free parameters and their values are set to match the data of the country under consideration. In particular, we are looking at values of n and N such that two conditions are satisfied. First, in the absence of any policy the percentage of consumers choosing the unhealthy diet equals 68% for the US and 57% for the UK. Second, amongst these consumers whose optimal consumption can be changed from the unhealthy diet to the healthy one, i.e. consume x = 1 but would consume x = 0 if their diet had been healthy in the past (x 0 = 0), the maximum number of quarters needed for such a change is six (a year and a half). We have found no empirical reference for the average time it takes for an overweight person to achieve a BMI below 25. Nevertheless, medical literature suggests that a key challenge in weight loss interventions is to both attain initial weight loss and to maintain that weight loss over periods of 12 months or more (Volpp et al. (2008) ). 11 Using the values of δ, p x , p 1−x and the distribution γ ∼ N [0,1] (µ, σ 2 ) with σ 2 = 0.1 and µ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}, we find that a habit parameter of n = 50 and scaling factors of N = 2740 for the US and N = 990 for the UK fulfil our two desired requirements. 12 With respect to the different policies, we consider the value of the tax and the subsidy fixed at 10%. This value is greater than the 1.5% to 7.25% soft drink and snack food tax applied in different US states (Jacobson and Brownell (2000)). We choose a higher tax (and subsidy) given that, as argued by Jacobson and Brownell (2000) , current tax levels are too small to affect unhealthy food consumption. A further discussion on the different sizes of the tax/subsidy we could consider is presented in section 5.5.
When considering cash incentives, we assume that the amount of money given to each consumer per quarter equals to the difference between the quarterly cost of consuming healthy food and the quarterly cost of consuming unhealthy food. This ensures that all consumers find it optimal to follow a healthy diet for at least as long as the policy lasts. Given the numerical values derived above, we have that the quarterly amount of cash given must equal $2, 693.26 in case of the US and £971.76 in case of the UK. We could assume instead that each consumer receives exactly the amount of cash needed to have the healthy diet as optimal choice. However, this poses a problem from the applied policy point of view because it may not be possible or feasible to discriminate amongst consumers. Similarly, it may be difficult to monitor consumers to ensure they are consuming healthy food. Nevertheless, this could be implemented by regular weight and BMI checks in governments' health office.
The costs of implementing each policy are calculated as follows. We assume that taxing unhealthy food has no implementation costs. The cost of implementing the subsidy is given by the amount of the subsidy itself. The cost of implementing cash incentives equals the amount of cash to be given per quarter to each consumer times the number of quarters needed to 11 Moreover, we have run numerical simulations where the maximum number of quarters needed for changing the consumer's habits is either five or seven and found that results are very similar to those obtained when such number equals six. However, the effectiveness of cash incentives seems to depend slightly negatively on the number of quarters considered. 12 We stress here that neither N nor the strength of the habit parameter n are chosen freely, their values are calibrated using the data described above.
change the habits of the consumer being targeted. We assume that cash incentives are given only to those consumers who can successfully change their unhealthy habits. The latter could be implemented by tracking information about consumers' weight, for example, by weekly updating consumers' weight on a government website, and at the end of each quarter the consumer have to check her weight on the nearest governments' health service office.
The benefit of each policy is calculated by looking at the expense that does not occur if a particular policy is implemented (avoidable costs). In our model, the avoidable cost is the money that the security system saves because of the reduction in the number of overweight people. In the case of a tax, in addition to the avoidable costs the revenue from the tax is also considered as a benefit.
Each policy has the added benefit that it increases the utility of the population. Both whilst the policy is in place because of the subsidy or the monetary rewards and also in the long term because of the decrease in unhealthy food consumption. We have chosen not to consider the increase in utility as a benefit for the society for several reasons. First, we would be adding utility to money, which makes no sense from the methodological point of view even though the utility function assumed is quasi-linear in wealth. Second, we would need to aggregate the utilities of different consumers. Finally and most importantly, we want to take the conservative approach of focusing only on the monetary benefits of each policy instead of the social ones.
To calculate the amount of money the social security system saves per overweight patient we proceed as follows. The total saving per overweight patient is equal to the total cost per overweight patient (avoidable cost). The total cost per overweight patient is equal to the cost per overweight patient per year times the number of years each overweight patient receives medical treatment. By total cost per overweight patient we mean the additional cost that an overweight patient imposes on the social security system when compared to a non-overweight patient.
In the US, the cost to Medicare per overweight patient per year is, on average, $600.00
extra when compared to a non-overweight patient (Finkelstein et al. (2009) ). 13 We consider that patients enter Medicare at the age of 65 and live for an average of 77 years minus 3 years for being overweight. 14 Thus, if we harmonise to 2010 US dollars and assume an annual interest rate of 3%, then each overweight person costs Medicare on average $5, 318.67.
In the UK, there is no evidence of the additional cost to the NHS of an overweight patient compared to a normal weight patient. The approach we take is to calculate the additional cost of an overweight patient for the NHS as the ratio between the total overweight cost and 
Numerical Results
We simulate the model for both the US and the UK and the three different policies for a population of 100 consumers and then scale up the results to a population of 304.37 million 15 This is a sensible assumption given that all UK residents have the right to NHS treatment. 16 Measured in 2007 British pounds (Scarborough et al. (2011) ). 17 We do not have information on the average age overweight people start receiving NHS attention. However, it was communicated to us by a NHS official in the Leicestershire Nutrition and Dietetic Service that the average age in their NHS weight loss groups is about 59 years old.
in the case of the US and a population of 61.40 million in the case of the UK. 18 We proceed in this way so simulating the model is computationally more convenient. Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the simulations of our model given the calibration just described. By looking at both tables, we can conclude that:
1. Cash incentives is the most effective policy in reducing unhealthy food consumption.
2. However, cash incentives is the least profitable policy and can lead to significant monetary costs.
3. Taxes are relatively ineffective in reducing unhealthy food consumption.
4. Subsidies is the most profitable policy and relatively effective in reducing unhealthy food consumption.
Cash incentives is the most effective policy to reduce the number of people with unhealthy diets. This result is due to the fact that, given the discount factor and the presence of habit, most consumers' behaviour depend on their initial diets. Moreover, the amount of cash incentives is such that those consumers with unhealthy habit find it is optimal to change to the healthy diet (at least) during the policy is implemented. Hence, given the amount of cash incentives and that most consumers initially choose unhealthy diets, motivating healthy food consumption via cash incentives has a significant positive effect on the aggregate level of unhealthy food consumption.
The reason behind the ineffectiveness of a tax is because, given the differences in prices between healthy and unhealthy food, a 10% change in the cost of unhealthy food has a small absolute effect. To illustrate this point, note that a 10% tax increases the quarterly cost of unhealthy food by $76.95 in the US and £27.77 in the UK, while a 10% subsidy reduces the quarterly cost of healthy food by $346.28 in the US and £124.94 in the UK. This issue is discussed further in section 5.5.
Cash incentives are relatively costly and can lead to significant monetary costs. This is specially relevant in the US, where cash incentives, although very effective in reducing unhealthy food consumption, can lead to a net long term expense of $1, 522, 214 million. The reason for this lies in the differences between both countries' social security systems. In the US an overweight person will generate costs to the public sector during 9 years, while in the UK an overweight person generates such costs during 15 years. This explains why the monetary benefits for the public sector for reducing unhealthy food consumption are greater in the UK than in the US.
18 Population in 2008, US Census Bureau (US) and Office for National Statistics (UK). Finally, although higher values of µ imply higher long term loss in utility from eating unhealthy, higher values of µ also make it harder to change from an unhealthy diet to a healthy one. This is the reason why there is a non-monotonic relation between µ and the total consumption of unhealthy food when subsidies are considered. We not always observe such non-monotonicity when the tax is considered because, as already argued, its absolute effect is lower than that of the subsidy. 
Obese Population
A reasonable question is whether we obtain the same results when only obese people are considered. That is, if we regard consumers whose BM I is between 25 and 30 as not following an unhealthy diet. This is the object of study in this subsection.
The parameters γ, µ, σ 2 , t and δ are set to the same values as the ones used in the previous calibration. According to the WHO, 34% of the US population and 21% of the UK population is obese. According to this information we set at random x 0 = 1 for 34% of the population and x 0 = 0 for 66% of the population in the case of the US, and x 0 = 1 for 21%
of the population and x 0 = 0 for 79% of the population in the case of the UK.
Using equation ( unhealthy diets) to their implementation costs is higher.
The calibration and simulation of the model when only obese consumers are considered enforces the idea that subsidies seem the best alternative to solve the obesity problem.
Alternative Social Security Costs (US)
In a recent paper Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012) provide an alternative measure of the marginal effect of obesity on medical care costs. They find that an obese person raises medical expenditures by $2, 418 (in 2005 US dollars) relative to a non-obese person. Cawley and Meyerhoefer suggests that previous literature has underestimated the medical costs of obesity and, therefore, the economic rationale for government intervention to reduce obesityrelated externalities. Table 7 shows the result of the simulations of our model considering the alternative obesity cost estimated by Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012).
As it can be seen in table 7, most of our previous conclusions are still valid. The only difference is that with higher costs per obese person cash incentives no longer lead to a deficit in the social security budget. This is simply caused by the fact that now the benefits of reducing obesity are more acute. Nevertheless, we still find that subsidies are the most cost-effective policy. Cost: Total amount of money given to beneficiaries of cash incentives.
Further Discussion on Taxes and Subsidies
In our analysis, we have assumed both a 10% tax and a 10% subsidy. Given the quasi-linear structure of the utility function, the effect of a given s% subsidy can be achieved with a py px s% tax. As the ratio between prices is 4.5, a 10% subsidy has the same effects as a 45% tax. The reason why we have focused on relatively low values (10%) for the tax and the subsidy are the following: from the applied policy point of view, a 45% tax on unhealthy food may be harder to implement than a 10% subsidy just by the sheer magnitude of the numbers. Thus, from this perspective, we suggest that subsidies may be a better option than taxes because consumption then an infinite tax will achieve this result at no monetary cost. This is an unrealistic option because of implementation issues as we mentioned in the paragraph above.
Moreover, in our model, the higher the tax/subside the more effective the policy will be and, thus, the question on what is the optimal tax/subside will depend ultimately on what can be realistically implemented. In this paper we have contributed in two ways to the optimal tax/subsidy issue: first, at equal levels (an up to 4.5 more tax than subsidy) a subsidy is more effective than a tax, second, we have quantified how much effective these policies are in the case of 10% tax/subsidy.
Policy Recommendations
Upon analysis the results suggest that subsidies are superior to taxes because subsidies are both more effective in reducing unhealthy food consumption and produce higher long term monetary benefits to the society. Therefore governments should put their efforts into subsi-dising healthy food rather than taxing unhealthy food.
Cash incentives is in most circumstances the best policy to reduce unhealthy food consumption but it is an expensive alternative; cash incentives can lead to very significant long term losses for the government. Although subsidies are not as effective as cash incentives, subsidies can significantly reduce unhealthy food consumption and provide the highest monetary benefits to the society. In our analysis no reference nor claim is made regarding potential non-monetary benefits of having a healthier population. Thus, although cash incentives potentially lead to considerably monetary expenses and a deficit in the social security budget, it could be the case that the non-monetary benefits of this policy off-set or justify its implementation.
Conclusion
To handle the obesity problem governments have responded with a variety of interventions:
product taxes, banning private advertising of foods that are high in fat, salt and sugar, promoting advertising of the consequences of unhealthy food consumption, banning sale of highly sugar-filled products in public schools, etc. Currently there is a discussion regarding cash incentives being used to promote healthy behaviour. Within this context, we addressed the following questions: are taxes, subsidies or cash incentives effective to reduce unhealthy food consumption? If so, which is the most appropriate policy to tackle the obesity problem?
Our results suggest that cash incentives can be the most effective policy in reducing unhealthy food consumption. Taxes, on the contrary, are relatively ineffective in reducing unhealthy food consumption. The comparison of the monetary benefits due to the reduction in costs for the social security system and the implementation costs of each policy suggest that cash incentives can lead to significant monetary losses. Finally, we found that subsidies have the best balance between effectiveness in reducing unhealthy food consumption and monetary benefits to the society.
This paper contributes to the economic analysis of unhealthy food consumption and to the public debate on how to tackle the obesity problem. This paper is novel as within this topic we built, calibrated and simulated a theoretical model to US and UK data, thus quantifying the effects of the different policies. There are several issues left for possible future research, for instance considering hyperbolic discounting or assuming a non-separable utility function amongst other. Nevertheless, this paper sheds new light on the issue of how to tackle the obesity problem by suggesting subsides rather than taxes or cash incentives, as a potential solution.
